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COMMENT
The Role of the Courts Under the National
Environmental Policy Act
When the National Environmental Policy Act' (NEPA) was enacted in
1970, it was widely acclaimed as a watershed in the battle to protect man's
natural surroundings. The federal government had finally acknowledged
the responsibility for preserving the environment. The Act crystallized en-
vironmental protection into national policy, set up procedures for federal
agencies to increase their awareness of the environmental effects of their
actions and established a Council on Environmental Quality to assist in the
implementation of these policies. One commentator described the Act as
"creating a bill of rights for the protection of the environment" and "the
present keystone of the Congressional defense of ecology."'2
Presently, some two and a half years after enactment, it is not clear that
the promise of NEPA has materialized. If anything, the Act has established
a formidable record as an instigator of appellate court decisions. When
conservation groups and individuals affected by federal projects tried to
compel the federal agencies to comply with the Act, serious questions as to
its interpretation arose. For example, at the outset it was not clear that
NEPA imposed any judicially cognizable duties on federal instrumental-
ities.3 Another sizeable group of cases dealt with whether the procedural
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970), Act of January 1, 1970, PuB. L. No. 91-190,
§ 2, 83 Stat. 852.
2. Rheingold, A Primer on Environmental Litigation, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113,
121 (1970). See also Sandier, The National Environmental Policy Act, A Sheep in
Wolf's Clothing?, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139 (1970); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Envi-
ronmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612
(1970).
3. In Bucklein v. Volpe, 1 ELR 20043 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the court held that NEPA
was no more than a declaration of congressional policy. Although a few courts fol-
lowed this line, e.g., Sherry v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 3 ELR 20227 n.1 (D.
Mass. 1972); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Cal.
1972), modified, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973), the overwhelming authority is that
NEPA is mandatory on federal agencies in at least some respects. See, e.g., Zabel v.
Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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requirements of the Act, especially the duty to prepare an environmental
impact statement for each major project, applied to federal projects which
were initiated before the Act became effective, but at the time of enact-
ment were not completed.4  However, perhaps the dispute most crucial to
the viability of the Act involves the relationship between the courts and
decisions made by administrative agencies under the Act. NEPA would
certainly be emasculated if agencies could circumvent statutory restrictions
and if the courts could not compel compliance to an effective degree.
The reason that courts have disagreed on the proper judicial attitude
toward agency determinations when challenged under NEPA can be traced
to the structure of the statute itself. The heart of NEPA lies in sections
101 and 102. Section 101(a) 5 recognizes the danger to the natural en-
vironment posed by urban society and asserts a continuing federal respon-
sibility to promote harmony between man and nature. In a similar vein,
section 101(b)6 establishes a federal policy to use all practical means to
4. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.
1972); Piritz v. Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885
(1st Cir. 1973); Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 732 (1971). Other points of contention involve stand-
ing, the scope of injunctive relief, and the timing of impact statements.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970):
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the inter-
relations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the pro-
found influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological ad-
vances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and main-
taining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of
man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in
cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public
and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, includ-
ing financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Ameri-
cans.
6. 42U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970):
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that
the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the envi-
ronment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which sup-
ports diversity and variety of individual choice;
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achieve six general long-range environmental goals, for example, assur-
ance of safe, productive and aesthetically pleasing surroundings. To imple-
ment these goals, section 1021 requires that, to the fullest extent possible,
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970):
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1)
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be. inter-
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chap-
ter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will in-
sure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the envi-
ronmental design arts in planning and in decision-making which may
have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with
the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this
chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision-
making along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for leg-
islation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jur-
isdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental im-
pact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to de-
velop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as pro-
vided by section 552 of Title 5 ,United States Code and shall accompany the
proposal through the existing agency processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmen-
tal problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs
designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and pre-
venting a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment;
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and
individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and
[Vol. 23:300
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federal policies, regulations and laws be interpreted and administered in
light of the policies of the Act and that federal agencies undertake eight
different procedures designed to create awareness and prevention of degrada-
tion of the environment. By far the most important of these, the require-
ment of section 102(2)(c) that an agency file a statement detailing the en-
vironmental cost of a federal action, has become the main weapon of con-
servationists in almost every suit brought under NEPA. Courts now agree
that agencies are not free to ignore the mandate of section 102.8 The
plain language of the statute seems to clearly support this rule. However,
federal agencies have frequently contended that where section 102 pro-
cedures have been carried out, the court does not have the power to review
the subsequent agency decision to continue with the project regardless of
the effect of the project on the environment vis-a-vis the policy set forth
in section 101 of NEPA. The conservationists, on the other hand, contend
that NEPA should preclude the initiation of certain federal projects be-
cause of their objectively determined degradation of natural surroundings.
Can the broad general policies of section 101, set out in generalities and
words incapable of precise meaning, be construed to evince a congressional
intent to permit judicial supervision, for environmental purposes, of federal
projects? To this day this question does not have a specific workable an-
swer and the future of NEPA as a viable means of protection and control
of the country's natural resources hangs in the balance. This paper will at-
tempt to review and categorize how the courts have dealt with or have
avoided this question. Some courts have had to struggle with a preliminary
but crucial question which involves the relationship of courts and agencies,
namely the so-called threshold decision or negative determination. 9 The
Act requires an environmental impact statement only for "legislation or
other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment."' 0 The threshold decision or negative determination is
made when an agency decides that its particular project either is not a
major federal action or does not significantly affect environmental values.
The decisions are divided on how far a court can go in reviewing such a de-
termination. Obviously the scope of review dramatically affects the Act's
development of resource-oriented projects; and
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by sub-
chapter II of this chapter.
8. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
9. The term "threshold decision" is often used to denote the preliminary decision
by an agency that NEPA is or is not applicable to a particular project. When an
agency decides that the requirements of the Act are inapplicable, the decision is some-
times referred to as a "negative determination."
10. Section 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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use as an effective tool for appreciation of environmental values." If an
agency could make a unilateral, facile finding that it was not subject to
impact statement requirements without the threat of a thorough judicial
review, the effect, in the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, would be to strip
NEPA of its fundamental importance.' 2  A survey of how the courts
have reacted to this problem is also in order.
Courts and Agency Decisions In General
The decisions on the relationship between courts and administrative deter-
minations under NEPA are significant when viewed in terms of the rela-
tionship between courts and agencies generally. For nearly seventy years,
it has been generally accepted that courts can review findings and deter-
minations by administrative bodies as to their correctness as a matter of
law.13 The scope of review rests on the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact. Traditionally, courts decide questions of law
and agencies determine questions of fact, but the court can only look to see
if the agency's findings of fact were reasonable. 14  The proper scope of
review employed by a court when reviewing agency findings of fact
is well established: ". . the courts will not examine the facts fur-
ther than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain
the order."' 5  However, courts do not exceed their authority by reviewing
questions which cannot be neatly classified as of law or of fact. Such
"mixed questions" often involve the application of a statutory term to a par-
ticular fact situation, for which the "substantial evidence" test has been deem-
ed inappropriate. Courts have devised the so-called "rational basis" test'"
for application in these types of situations. Under this test, a court will
uphold an agency determination if it has a "warrant in the record" and a
"reasonable basis in fact."' 7
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),'8 which became law in 1946,
11. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v, AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
12. Id. at 1115.
13. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
14. Id.
15. ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1912).
16. 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.01 (1958).
17. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939). This rule
has often been referred to as the doctrine of Gray v. Powell following a landmark
Supreme Court decision. 314 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1941). See NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Professor Davis has pointed out that on occasion
the courts will eschew the "rational basis" test in reviewing mixed questions of law
and fact and either treat the issue as a question of fact or substitute its own judgment
for that of the agency. 4 Y, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATvE LAW TREATISE, §§ 30.05, 30.07
(1958).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
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codified a presumption of reviewability for agency determinations and in-
cluded a rather complex scope of review provision which set forth six differ-
ent standards of review.' In 1971, the Supreme Court provided an exegesis
of this provision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.20 Sec-
tion 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act 2' precludes the Secre-
tary from approving a federal highway through parks if a "feasible and
prudent" alternative exists. Highways could be put through parks only if
"all possible planning to minimize harm" had been completed. A similar
provision was in the Federal-Aid Highway Act.2 2  The particular litigation
arose when the Secretary approved a six-lane highway through Overton
Park in Memphis. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that feasible and pru-
dent alternatives to the Overton Park route existed and that the Secretary's
finding to the contrary should be set aside. The Supreme Court decided that
the Administrative Procedure Act governed the standard of review. In all
cases of reviewable23 agency action, courts will set aside the agency deter-
mination if it is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion or other-
wise not in accordance with law,2 4 or if it contravenes statutory, procedural
or constitutional requirements. 25  Under the APA, the Court held that the
traditional "substantial evidence" test,26 applies only when the agency ac-
tion to be reviewed was taken pursuant to the rulemaking or adjudicatory
procedures set up in the Act. The court said that a reviewing court cannot en-
gage in de novo review27 unless the agency action was the result of an ad-
judicatory procedure and the fact-finding procedures were inadequate. The
Court then applied this provision to the particular determination made by
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970):
.... The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to section
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
Sections 556 and 557 referred to in (E) above involve rulemaking and adjudications.
20. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
22. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(l)(A) (1970).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), (C), (D) (1970).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
27. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702 (1970).
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the Secretary, setting up a tripartite standard. First, the court should deter-
mine whether the Secretary acted within his authority, meaning within the
range specified by Congress. Secondly, the court should apply the arbi-
trary and capricious standard. In deciding what is arbitrary, the court must
look to see if the administrative determination considered all the relevant
factors and was not a clear error of judgment. At this point, the Court felt
it necessary to make a clarification which underlined the limitations on re-
view:
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.28
As its third duty, the reviewing court must decide whether the Secretary's
action followed the necessary procedural requirements.
29
The Threshold Determination
The vast majority of litigation which has arisen under NEPA to date con-
cerns the section 102(2)(C) provision for preparation of an environmental im-
pact statement. Impact statements are not mandated for each government
project, only those which are "major federal actions" which "significantly
affect" the environment. The volume of litigation indicates that conserva-
tionists and concerned citizens have widely differing views on the definition
of "major" and "significant." 0  Reviewing courts have taken varying ap-
proaches when confronted by an allegation that an agency has erroneously
determined that a project is not significant enough to require an impact
statement.
A number of cases have held that the court can decide for itself if an
agency's negative determination regarding the necessity for an impact state-
ment is correct, as if the question were one of law. In Scherr v. Volpe,31
the Secretary of Transportation approved a federally funded highway-wid-
ening project without filing an impact statement. The trial court issued an
injunction and the Secretary, in moving for a suspension of the injunction,
claimed that the highway program was not a major project which signifi-
28. 401 U.S. at 416.
29. Tn addition, the Court held that review was not precluded by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, that formal findings of fact by the Secretary were not required
and that review should be on the entire administrative record. This latter issue has
occasionally been raised in suits under NEPA. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 2749 (1973).
30. See Note, Threshold Determinations by Federal Agencies under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 235 (1973).
31. 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 23: 300
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cantly affected the environment. The court decided that it could review the
question de novo if it so chose for two reasons. First, although Congress
could delegate discretionary powers to an administrative body, the mandate
of section 102(2)(C) constituted a "flat command" to the agency. The
agency could determine what section 102(2)(C) demanded, but its deci-
sion carries no weight when a party challenges its validity. Secondly, the
court decided that it should review the issue as one of law rather than one
of fact because a reviewing court must interpret two statutory standards,
namely, "major federal action" and "significantly affecting" the environ-
ment. Thereafter, the court must apply them to a particular project and
then decide whether the agency's decision violated the statute.3 2 A few
other cases have followed Scherr explicitly.33  In a larger number of cases,
courts have decided the validity of an agency's negative determination as
a matter of law without any deference to agency discretion or discussion of
the proper scope of review.3 4  In Students Concerned about Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States3 5 for example, the court
decided that, regardless of the agency's contention, section 102(2)(C) pro-
cedures must be followed whenever the proposed action will arguably have
an adverse environmental impact. NEPA would be rendered meaningless
if an agency could avoid its mandate under the statute by merely asserting
that it finds no need to comply.30
A second line of cases holds that the "rational basis" test should govern
when a court reviews a negative threshold determination. Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird3 7 is a leading case in this regard. The Department of De-
fense proposed a mock amphibious landing and bivouac by Marines at a
32. The court's language may technically be dicta, since the court decided that
if it is assumed that the agency possessed some discretion, it had abused that discre-
tion here.
33. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
34. In Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972), the court concluded
that the total record before it failed to demonstrate any significant adverse effect on
the environment, thus the National Forest Service's finding to that effect will be up-
held. See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
35. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), stay denied sub nom. Aber-
deen & Rockfish Ry. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).
36. The court also finds support for its rule in the Guidelines issued by the Council
on Environmental Quality, which stated that where proposed actions are likely to be
"controversial" in environmental impact, § 102(2) (C) statements should be filed in
all cases. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). Reliance on the Guidelines creates some thorny
legal problems. The CEQ is not authorized by statute to issue regulations, thus the
Guidelines are merely advisory in nature. Nevertheless, courts will often rely on them
in solving issues concerning threshold decisions and other NEPA-related questions.
37. 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
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state park uniquely adapted for this purpose. After a study of the environ-
mental consequences, an administrative officer concluded that the project
was not major and did not significantly affect the environment. In con-
sidering this determination, the court decided that since it had to apply statu-
tory terms to a particular situation, it would uphold the threshold decision
if that decision had a warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law.A8
Another district court employed the same standard in reviewing a Tennes-
see Valley Authority determination that filing individualized environmental
impact statements for a series of coal purchases would violate a provision of
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 9
The third possible standard for review is the "arbitrary and capricious"
test embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act. In Hanly v. Klein-
dienst,40 the Second Circuit held that, for three essential reasons, this was in-
deed the proper standard in the face of the Government's claim that the
"rational basis" test should prevail. First, the meaning of the term "signi-
ficantly affecting" (the project was conceded to be major) can be isolated
as a question of law. The significance of this point is not clear from the
opinion. Following both the traditional view and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, a court can review de novo questions of law. 41 Apparently the
court meant that since the agency decision was closer to an issue of law than
of fact, the large amount of discretion which the Agency claimed for itself
was not warranted. Secondly, the Supreme Court in Overton Park applied
the "arbitrary" standard to a similar agency determination of the meaning of
a statutory prohibition and an administrative finding thereon. Finally, it
was argued that the "arbitrary" standard provided for the proper balance
between effective judicial scrutiny and allowing an agency some leeway in
applying law in the area of expertise. 42  The "arbitrary and capricious"
38. The court also applied the test of arbitrariness and found no claim for a viola-
tion under that standard.
39. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 5 ERC 1316 (E.D. Tenn.
April 17, 1973).
40. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 5 ERC 1416 (May 21,
1973). The suit was brought by neighbors of the Foley Square Courthouse in New
York City where the General Services Administration proposed to construct a deten-
tion center adjacent to the court building. GSA submitted a twenty-five page state-
ment in support of its negative determination. The court concluded that more doc-
umentation was needed and remanded for further factfinding. The case had previously
been before the court of appeals. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir) cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
41. 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958); 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(1970).
42. Chief Judge Friendly dissented, claiming that the majority's rule allows too
many federal projects, more that Congress intended, to be labeled as of no significant
environmental effect. Also, the majority's requirements might cause the negative deter-
mination to become a "mini" impact statement. As a solution, Judge Friendly sug-
[Vol. 23: 300
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test has a substantial number of adherents in threshold determination
cases.
43
The Fifth Circuit, in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,44 has proposed a
fourth standard for review of agency decisions which have found that
federal programs are not major or not significant in effect upon the natural
surroundings. The court of appeals rejected the contention that the "arbi-
trary" standard should be employed. This standard is most appropriate,
the court said, where factual determinations are under review, but it should
not be applied to a "basic jurisdiction-type conclusion involved here."' 45
Where imposition of statutorily mandated procedures depends on the out-
come of an administrative decision, a broader scope of review is necessary:
The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte de-
cision that the project was minor or did not significantly affect
the environment were too well shielded from impartial review ...
The primary decision to give or by-pass the consideration required
by the Act must be subject to inspection under a more searching
standard.
46
The court mandated the standard of "reasonableness" which is broader than
the standard of arbitrariness. The court found support for its conclusion,
as did the Hanly court, in the Overton Park decision. According to the Ten
Acres opinion, the Supreme Court employed the "arbitrary and capricious"
rule only with regard to the ultimate administrative decision on the merits of
the project. Overton Park teaches that "a more penetrating inquiry" is ap-
propriate for review of the threshold determination.47  The Ten Acres
opinion represents a significant departure from the classic doctrine on scope
of judicial review and apparently is a maverick.
A more recent decision of the same court48 indicates that the "reason-
ableness" test might not be as broad as the Ten Acres decision implies. The
gested that impact statements be required in all gray areas. 471 F.2d at 837-38. The
majority contended that providing for an impact statement in all controversial cases
is not workable since, as in zoning cases, there is some opposition to virtually all
projects, regardless of size or impact. Id. at 830 n.9A.
43. Echo Park Residents Committee v. Romney, 3 ERC 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 349
F. Supp. 1212 (D.D.C. 1972); Durnford v. Ruckelshaus, 5 ERC 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
44. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). The General Services Administration decided
that the construction of a federal building in downtown Mobile did not "significantly
affect" the environment. In the ensuing lawsuit, the defendants claimed that the deter-
mination was not arbitrary or capricious.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id.
47. id.
48. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
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case involved a proposed federally funded low and moderate income apart-
ment complex which the Department of Housing and Urban Development
concluded was not within the requirements of section 102(2)(C) proce-
dures. In addition to the administrative record, the district court conducted
a full-scale trial with additional witnesses and evidence on the correctness
of the HUD negative determination. This, according to the court of ap-
peals, distinguished the case factually from Ten Acres. A court need not en-
gage in testing a threshold decision for reasonableness where the plaintiff does
not raise "substantial environmental issues."'40  However, it is not clear which
test the court employed, since the opinion merely concluded that the HUD
determination was not erroneous as a matter of law. At a minimum the
case indicates Ten Acres may not be as innovative as originally thought.
The ruminations of the courts on the proper scope of review of agency
threshold determinations obviously does not fit into a pattern. A few gen-
eral observations can be made. To begin with, courts have often shown diffi-
culty distinguishing between the different standards when attempting to ap-
ply them.50 Courts often will not consciously employ the standard it de-
clares to be applicable, 5 ' or will apply more than one standard. 52 It is a
fairly discernible trend that courts will hold for de novo review of thresh-
old decisions where the negative determination was made by an agency as
a bald assertion without any independent inquiry on its part. In the SCRAP
case, for instance, the threshold determination amounted to one sentence in
one of the contested ICC orders. 53 In Scherr v. Volpe, the agency defen-
dants made no assertion, apparently, that the project was not within the
statutory requirements of section 102(2)(C) until their motion for suspension
of the injunction. It seems indisputable that the de novo rule is appropriate
in these kinds of cases, where the court has nothing to review and conse-
quently is encouraged to make an independent determination. The Act
does not expressly compel judicial review, but it appears that the courts
feel compelled as a matter of law to make their own determination.
The rationale is less understandable, however, in those decisions opting
for the "rational basis" test and the standard of arbitrariness. The thresh-
49. 476 F.2d at 425.
50. See Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Oakes, J. dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), afi'd on other
grounds, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336
F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
53. The opinion suggests that the scope of review might be different if the ICC
had conducted a detailed study and then concluded that no impact statement was nec-
essary. 346 F. Supp. at 201 n.17.
[Vol. 23:300310
Environmental Policy Act
old determination can probably be most accurately classified as a mixed
question of law and fact, the application of a statutory term to particular
facts. According to well-settled precedents, it should be governed by the
"rational basis" test.54  The Hanly opinion discussed the test with some
approval, 5  but then rejected it out of hand without much explanation. The
most potent argument against the "rational basis" rule is the Overton Park
decision in which that test was not discussed regarding a similar mixed ques-
tion. Whether Overton Park should be interpreted as sub silento overruling
the well established line of cases supporting the "rational basis" test is a
close question. It seems unlikely that the Court would have intended to
reject a proposition which has become so embedded in the fabric of ad-
ministrative law without some specific language to that effect. The Court
has continued to insist on the "rational basis" test after the Administrative
Procedure Act became effective. 56 However, in the face of the strong
Overton Park precedent, most courts seem to have chosen the APA standard
of arbitrariness.
For essentially the same reasons, few courts are likely to adopt the "rea-
sonableness" test promulgated in the Ten Acres case. The rule is an exten-
sion of the rationale employed by courts when faced with a threshold deter-
mination made without an administrative inquiry and is based on a policy
of preventing easy circumvention of statutory restrictions. Such an exten-
sion might not be warranted where agency expertise has been employed in
the threshold decision. Furthermore, the reliance on Overton Park seems
misplaced. The Ten Acres opinion asserted that the Supreme Court estab-
lished a bifurcated standard, one for the ultimate decision, i.e. whether the
project should be undertaken and another for the preliminary one, i.e.
is an impact statement required. However, it seems that only one adminis-
trative finding was challenged in Overton Park, the decision of the Secretary
under the "prudent and feasible alternative" clause. The same is true in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,57 which Ten
Acres cites for further support. 8 The state of the law on the whole ques-
tion is by no means clear and must await further judicial clarification.59
54. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
55. 471 F.2d at 829.
56. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); NLRB
v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968); Thorpe v. Housing Authority,
393 U.S. 268 (1969).
57. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
58. 472 F.2d at 466 n.5.
59. A whole body of case law has developed under § 102(2) (C) in which standards
have been set up to determine when, as a matter of law, a project comes within
the meaning of the crucial terms of that provision. Some of the major cases are:
19731
Catholic University Law Review
The Ultimate Decision on the Merits o1 a Project
The foregoing survey of scope of review cases regarding agency threshold
determinations might suggest that courts stand ready to prevent an obvious
circumvention of section 102 requirements. The court decisions indicate
that mere satisfaction of procedural duties does not assure compliance with
the NEPA objectives. The procedures of section 102 seem to envision mod-
ification of the environmentally damaging aspects of a project or even termi-
nation of the project if it has a sufficiently serious effect on the natural sur-
roundings. In the words of the Act's sponsor, the procedural requirements
were intended to be "action-forcing." ' 0 However, no provision in the
Act compels modification or termination of environmentally undesirable
programs. This lack of express direction could conceiveably precipitate the
frustration of the underlying purpose of NEPA, because agencies could
satisfy the statutory mandate merely by considering, albeit in good faith,
deleterious environmental consequences of proposed actions in an impact
statement and then proceed to complete the program, giving no weight
to the environmental factors. In addition, agencies would not be forced to
establish a series of standards under which future projects could be judged.
Consequently, courts have been forced to consider whether NEPA limits
in any way the agency's discretion to undertake a major federal project
which has a substantial effect on its surroundings. Courts which have en-
tertained the question have viewed it from two different vantage points:
what is the proper scope of review of a substantive agency determination on
the merits of a project vis-a-vis the policies of NEPA; or does the Act,
especially the policy provisions of section 101, bestow on plaintiffs sub-
stantive rights to a good environment which can be judicially enforced against
federal agencies. The essence of both questions is the same. Does NEPA
intend that federal projects which inflict serious damage on the environmnt
be terminated or modified merely because of the amount of environmental
harm involved? The usefulness of NEPA as a tool of environmental con-
trol depends on the answer.
The Scope of Review Cases
Calvert Cliffs and Its Progeny
The District of Columbia Circuit issued the first major systematic analysis
Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Bradford Township v. Illinois State
Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972);
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d
593 (10th Cir. 1972); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir.
1973); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F.
Supp. 310 (N.D. W. Va. 1972).
60. 115 CONG. REC. 19009 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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of NEPA on an appellate court level in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Com-
mittee, Inc. v. AEC.61 This case, which has become a landmark in all of
environmental law, said that the substantive decision by an agency to pro-
ceed with a given project was subject to a limited form of judicial review.
That standard of judicial review has since been elaborated by subsequent
opinions by the same court.
The scope of review enunciated by the court in Calvert Cliffs relates
directly to its perception of the structure of section 101 and 102. The policy
statements in section 101 impose an explicit duty on the government. How-
ever, the duty is a flexible one; it leaves room for a "responsible exercise"
of agency discretion.62 In contrast, the procedural duties of section 102 are
not inherently flexible and do establish a strict standard of compliance. Fur-
thermore, implicit in the procedural duties of section 102(2) is a duty to
consider environmental issues in the agency's decision-making process which
in turn demands a "finely-tuned" and "systematic" balancing analysis of the
costs and benefits in each individual case.
0 3
Because of the mandatory nature of Section 102 courts must make a
careful review of the compliance with it, while only limited review can I-
afforded under section 101:
The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive deci-
sion on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that
the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbi-
trary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.6
4
(emphasis added)
The court's duties under section 102 are not as restricted:
But if the decision was reached procedurally without individual-
ized consideration and balancing of environmental factors--con-
ducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of the
courts to reverse.65
61. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 1112-13 n.9.
63. Id. at 1113. In support of his view of NEPA, Judge J. Skelly Wright relied
on the language of the Act together with its legislative history, especially the state-
ments of Senator Jackson, the Act's sponsor.
64. Id. at 1115.
65. Id. In addition to the tentative nature of some of the language, the court's
conclusions on the scope of review is further weakened as a solid precedent since they
are technically dicta. Neither a substantive agency decision nor an alleged failure
to meet procedural requirements was at issue. The suit involved four regulations estab-
lished by the AEC to implement compliance by the AEC with NEPA. One rule stated
that the hearing board need not consider environmental factors where not raised by
the parties in a licensing procedure; another prohibited consideration of the environ-
mental factors by the hearing board at proceedings which were officially noticed before
March 4, 1971. A third regulation precluded consideration of environmental conse-
quences which were in the domain of other agencies. The final rule provided for
preparation of impact statements by the parties rather than by the agency. The court
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The District of Columbia Circuit has subsequently stated that the judicial
review of what Calvert Cliffs called the "substantive agency decision" is
narrow. The issue arose in the litigation concerning the underground test
of a nuclear warhead at Amchitka Island, Alaska. 66 In a per curiam opin-
ion, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment because the environmental impact statement issued by the AEC was
inadequate, but not without issuing a disclaimer:
On the ultimate issue whether a project should be undertaken or
not, a matter involving the assessment and weighing of various
factors, the court's function is limited. 67
Again, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,68 the court
reaffirmed the discretion of the agency. As long as agencies take a "hard
look" at environmental conservation, the court did not seek to "impose un-
reasonable extremes or to interject itself within the area of discretion of the
executive as to the choice of the action to be taken." 69
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted, practically verbatim, the
Calvert Cliffs test.70 A larger number of courts have accepted the District
of Columbia Circuit's view of the flexible and inflexible nature of section
101 and 102 respectively, although they failed to reach the question of
scope of review. It seems likely that they would be in accord with Calvert
Cliffs on that issue also.7
1
The Administrative Procedure Act Cases
The Calvert Cliffs decision is notable in that it did not consider the applica-
tion of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the review of the sub-
stantive agency decision. 72  According to Overton Park, that scope of re-
found that each regulation violated either the spirit or letter of NEPA and that
the AEC regulations were an especially blatant attempt to circumvent the strictures
of NEPA.
66. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
67. Id. at 786-87.
68. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 838. The court's pronouncement here must also be viewed as dicta,
since the decision turned on the legal sufficiency of the impact statement and not
whether the Secretary's decision to institute the project, here the approval of offshore
oil and gas leases, was in compliance with the overall policy of the Act.
70. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir.
1973); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); City of New York v. United
States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
72. The Supreme Court's decision [in Overton Park] was issued March 3, 1971, about
four months prior to the Calvert Cliffs decision on July 7.
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view standard applied to agency determinations reviewable under the Act.
The particular nature of the administrative decision subjected to the APA in
Overton Park is similar to the agency decision to undertake a project. Both
require the exercise of administrative judgment and expertise within the
bounds of statutory prescriptions. Indeed, a fairly large number of cases have
applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the ultimate administrative
decision on federal projects; most have done so either without comment or
by merely citing the Supreme Court decision. For example, in Silva v.
Lynn,73 which reviewed an attack on the compliance with NEPA of a federally
assisted housing project, the court said:
In any event, the judicial inquiries are whether the agency's find-
ings and conclusions . . . are arbitrary, capricious, and abuse
of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law. .... 74
Calvert Cliffs and the cases which follow it do not give a satisfactory ex-
planation as to why the APA standard of arbitrariness should not apply to
agency decisions which concern the initiation of major projects. However,
one court has expressed doubt concerning the APA "substantial evidence"
standard in preference for the "arbitrary" and "clearly insufficient weight"
test of Calvert Cliffs. 7 5 The court suggested that although under estab-
lished precedent, the Interstate Commerce Commission's abandonment or-
der should be reviewed under the "substantial evidence" test as incorporated
into section 10(e) of the APA, for purposes of review under NEPA the
Calvert Cliffs test is applicable. The court explained that since an agency
decision under NEPA is not made pursuant to fact finding procedures, the
"substantial evidence" test is inappropriate.7 6 However, the reasoning fails
to explain why the standard of arbitrariness should not apply. Ultimately,
the distinction may be academic since the Calvert Cliffs and APA standards
differ only in minor degree.
The decisions following both the APA and Overton Park standards have
failed to discuss a question which is a condition precedent to judicial scru-
tiny under the scope of review section of the APA, reviewability.77 Un-
73. 482 F.2d 1282 (lst Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 1655. Accord, Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp.
132, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1971); National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 343 F. Supp.
696 (D. Mont. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
75. City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. N.Y. 1972) (three-
judge court).
76. The opinion noted that the congressional conference committee substituted the
requirement of a "finding" with the requirement of a "detailed statement" in the final
version. Neither Judge Friendly, who authored the opinion, nor the sponsors them-
selves seemed clear as to what the significance of the change was. Id. at 940.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
19731
Catholic University Law Review
der the APA not all agency action is subject to review, only those actions
where statutes do not preclude it or where the action is not "by law committed
to agency discretion."'78 Although a respectable argument might be made that
the decision whether or not to undertake a particular project was com-
mitted by law to the discretion of the agency initiating the project, it is not
clear that courts have actually considered this line of argument.
The Substantive Rights Cases
Conservationists have frequently argued that the declaration of congressional
policy of continuing responsiblity for preservation of the natural surroundings
bestows on the individual the right to a certain level of environmental qual-
ity against encroachment by federal instrumentalities. 79 When confronted
by this contention, courts have adopted completely conflicting viewpoints.
The courts which hold that NEPA creates no rights other than those pro-
cedural rights correlative to the duties imposed on agencies in section 102
of the Act are fairly numerous.8 0 The reasons against an interpretation
which finds substantive rights in NEPA are marshalled in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, Inc.s1 a lawsuit arising out of the con-
struction of Gillham Dam on the Cossatot River in Arkansas. Although
the decision was reversed by the court of appeals specifically on the ques-
tion of substantive rights, the opinion of Judge Eisele contained one of the
first major comprehensive treatments of NEPA and has exerted persuasive
influence on other courts. The plaintiffs alleged that the damming of the
Cossatot, which by the admission of all concerned parties would make the
stream no longer suitable for canoeing and fishing, violated section 101(b)
(4) of NEPA since it reduced "diversity and variety of choice," one of the
goals set for the federal government by the Act. Consequently, the plaintiffs
78. In Overton Park, the Supreme Court held that an agency decision was by law
committed to its discretion when the relevant statutes provided "no law to apply" to
the decision. The Court found that there was in the Department of Transportation
Act sufficient statutory restrictions on the Secretary to render his decision reviewable.
For a good argument that substantive agency decisions under NEPA should likewise
be reviewable, see Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the
National Environmental Policy Act, 3 ELR 50028 (1973).
79. Some commentaries have asserted the existence of a constitutional right to en-
vironmental protection. See also, note 82 infra.
80. Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th
Cir. 1971); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971); Piritz v.
Volpe, 4 ERC 1195 (M.D. Ala.), afI'd, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); Citizens for
Mass Transit Against Freeways, v.. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
81. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211




asked the court to prohibit construction of the dam. The court denied that
it had the power or duty to enjoin construction for two basic reasons. First,
NEPA was the product of a congressional compromise which replaced a
stronger8 2 bill with an act which only declared the national policy on the
environment. Secondly, nothing in the Act purports to vest rights in the
plaintiff or anyone else, or to give the court the power to reverse an agency
determination on the merits of its program.
If the Congress had intended to leave it to the courts to determine
such matters; if indeed, it had intended to give up its own preroga-
tives and those of the executive agencies in the respect, it cer-
tainly would have used explicit language to accomplish such a far-
reaching objective.
83
In the court's view, the statute is not left without some teeth. While NEPA
may not have altered existing decision making responsibilities or may not
have taken away any freedom of decision making, it is at the very least an
"environmental full disclosure law. ''8 4 Although agency officials can choose
to ignore environmental factors under NEPA, they must indicate that they
are doing so with open eyes. In a subsequent opinion in the same case,
Judge Eisele reaffirmed his view of NEPA:
... the plaintiffs here cannot look to the judiciary to reverse or
modify any decision with respect to the building of the [dam] ...
it must be [modified] . . .through . . . the executive or legis-
lative branches.
85
A district court in Mississippi reached a similar conclusion in a case in-
volving the building of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway86 in which some
additional arguments were advanced against an interpretation that NEPA
conferred substantive rights. In addition to noting the ambiguous lan-
guage of section 101, the court claimed that the phrase "to use all practi-
cable means" as found in section 101 vests broad discretion in administra-
tive officers to adopt environmental goals to other national policies8 7 and
82. A provision in the Senate bill stated that: "each person has a fundamental
and inalienable right to a healthful environment ....... However, the corresponding
compromise language in section 101(c) was adopted because the House conferees were
unsure of the "legal scope" implicit in the above provision. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2768-69 (91st Cong. 1969).
83. 325 F. Supp. at 755.
84. Id. at 759. Despite its disclaimer of power to halt the project, the court found
a way to enjoin the construction, holding that the Corps of Engineers violated the
procedural requirements of NEPA in at least ten different ways.
85. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211,
1216 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
86. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
87. Sections 104 and 105 clearly state that the duties imposed by the Act are not
substitutes for prior existing statutory duties and are supplemental to the goals and
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leaves the ultimate decision on a project to the agency.
The foremost authority for the proposition that NEPA did create sub-
stantive rights is the opinion of the Eighth Circuit in the Gillham Dam case. 8
Chief Judge Matthes, writing for the court, rejected, on the basis of the lan-
guage and legislative history of NEPA, the lower court holding that the Act
created no substantive rights. After a review of the salient points of section
101 and section 102, and noting that the section 102 procedures were in-
tended to implement section 101 policy, the court concluded:
The unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to con-
sider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the
Act, not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill govern-
ment archives.8 9
Implementation of substantive policy necessitates the balance of environ-
mental good and harm in the decision making process.
The second argument advanced in support of the existence of substantive
rights was the "presumption of reviewability" doctrine, rooted in either com-
mon law or the APA and under which any administrative determination
affecting legal rights is reviewable unless there is a special reason for not so
doing.90 The opinion said that judicial review should be granted for three
reasons: NEPA was silent about review, there was no special reason to cut
off judicial scrutiny, and legal rights were affected by the agency's deci-
sion.91 The court's ruling indicates that the plaintiff's substantive rights are
rights to judicial scrutiny of the agency decision of the merits of a project.
The standard under which judicial review operates is, according to the court,
the familiar test of arbitrariness as set out in the APA and applied in Over-
ton Park. Where NEPA is specifically involved, the Calvert Cliffs "arbi-
trary or clearly insufficient weight" rule applies. 92  The view that the court
policies already set out in the existing authorizations of federal agencies.
88. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2749 (1973).
For a good summary of the case for substantive rights under NEPA, see Arnold, The
Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy
Act, 3 ELR 50028 (1973).
89. 470 F.2d at 298.
90. The opinion cites Professor Davis, 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE
18, 25 (1958).
91. The court also relies on the Calvert Cliffs line of cases, Overton Park, the opin-
ion of the CEQ, and commentaries on the Act. A number of subsequent decisions
have adopted the substantive rights interpretation: Conservation Council of North Car-
olina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359
F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 5 ERC
1183 (E.D. Tenn. March 21, 1973).
92. The court of appeals went on to hold that the Corps of Engineers' decision
to complete the dam was not arbitrary and thus no relief was appropriate. The envi-




construed the substantive rights as no more than a right to a limited review
of an ultimate agency decision was supported in a subsequent opinion by
the same court. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,93 which
concerned a channelization project along the Cache River, the court reiter-
ated the holding in the Gillham Dam case, but stressed that review was
limited to the standards applied in that case and asserted that the court was
not empowered to substitute its judgment on the merits of the project, the
same kind of language which is often found in the "no substantive rights"
cases. 
94
The last shot in the battle over substantive rights has by no means been
fired. Recently, in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,95 a district court in Texas found
that NEPA imposed a substantive duty and a correlative right different from
the right to limited judicial review. Under the Act, the court held that fed-
eral agencies must mitigate some and possibly all of the environmental im-
pacts likely to arise from a particular project. The court drew this conclu-
sion from the "all practicable means" language of section 101(b) and the
Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines and proposed regulations of
the Environmental Protection Agency which state that the purpose of the
impact statement procedure is to avoid adverse effects. 96 The cases which
have held that there are no substantive rights are valid only to the extent
that NEPA does not give the courts the final decision on the advisability of
a particular project. But the court argues that, to the exent that this position
allows the agencies merely to "disclose the likely harm without reflecting
a substantial effort to prevent or minimize environmental harm, it is not
. .. . [accurate]." '97  Whether this position will gain judicial adherence
remains to be seen.
Conclusion
The state of the law on the relationship between the courts and the ultimate
agency decision to undertake the proposed program is neither consistent
nor well-defined. A few conclusions can be asserted. First, most courts,
especially those which have faced the issues more recently, will subject the
ultimate administrative decision to some limited form of judicial scrutiny.
Generally, some kind of standard of arbitrariness is employed based on
the APA or the language of Calvert Cliffs. Although the position of the
93. 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
94. See note 80 supra.
95. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
96. CEQ Guidelines § 2, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971), Proposed EPA Reg. § 6.45(b)
(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 883 (1972). The court pointed out that it had been advised
that all proposed EPA regulations were then in effect. 359 F. Supp. at 1323, n.109.
97. 359 F. Supp. at 1340.
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courts on their relationship to administrative determinations under NEPA re-
mains crucial to the viability of the Act, the degree of judicial scrutiny or
the existence of substantive rights has not ultimately determined whether a
given federal project can be undertaken. In no major opinion except
one, where the function of the courts under NEPA was discussed at length,
did the final disposition turn on the court's conclusions on that issue. In
Calvert Cliffs, for example, the decision was based, not whether the agency
decision to construct the proposed project was arbitrary, but whether four
AEC rules designed to implement NEPA failed to comport with the pro-
cedural requirements of the Act. s Two cases following Calvert Cliffs,
Morton99 and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,100
enjoined the respective projects because the impact statements filed were
inadequate as a matter of law, not because of any inherent degradation
which would be visited upon the environment. The same holding was reach-
ed in Silva v. Lynn,101 the case which adhered to the APA. Although it
found no substantive rights, the district court in the Gillham Dam case en-
joined the project because of numerous violations of section 102 duties.102
However, the court of appeals in the same case decided which standard of re-
view was proper and then applied it to determine the outcome of the plain-
tiff's challenge to the project. This is the only example of a major NEPA
case in which the standard of review selected was crucial to the court's deci-
sion.10
3
It should be noted that in no case here discussed, nor in any case which
has come to light, have the courts set aside an ultimate agency decision on
the sole ground that it violated substantive rights or because it was arbi-
trary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental factors. Plaintiffs
have not succeeded by proceeding against the ultimate agency decision
alone. The road to victory under NEPA, where victory has occurred,
has clearly involved allegations of procedural violations of the impact
statement requirements. The implications for environmental suits are two-
fold: 1) projects which have severe repercussions on the natural surround-
ings will be difficult to halt permanently under NEPA, since eventually the
agency will conform the deficient statement or procedure to the mandate of
the courts; 2) predicting the outcome of NEPA suits will be harder, because
the necessary components of a legally adequate impact statment are not
98. See note 65 supra.
99. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See note 69 supra.
100. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
101. (1st Cir. 1973).
102. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
103. 470 F.2d 289 (8thCir. 1972), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 675 (1973).
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clear, and the criteria employed are less easily quantifiable. The following
examples demonstrate the disparity among courts on the issue. In the Gill-
ham Dam case, 10 4 the lower court held that a legally sufficient impact
statement must discuss all environmental aspects of the proposed action.
The court found numerous violations, including the failure to explore in-
jury to fish and wildlife as well as the use of the wrong interest rate in deter-
mining the cost-benefit ratio. On the other hand, in the Tombigbee Water-
way case, 10 5 the court required a legally sufficient impact statement to dis-
cuss only significant aspects of probable environmental effects of the proj-
ect. Thus, an environmental impact statement which did not discuss the
effect of the project on all the wildlife in the area and which did not discuss
the loss of geological and archeological treasures, was approved.
If anything, the foregoing analysis of the courts' treatment of both thresh-
old and substantive decisions by agencies suggests that courts will act to
prevent facile circumvention of an important policy statute nevertheless
fraught with vagueness and verbal loopholes. However, courts must
take the next step of applying a broader scope of judicial review to admin-
istrative decisions which could have a detrimental environmental effect. A
broader review on such decisions is justified by the congressional mandate
for environmental preservation which NEPA embodies. The extent of re-
view afforded environmentally related decisions, as of the present, does not
vary substantially from that given to other agency decisions under the gen-
eral principles of administrative law. Even the "substantive right" holdings
generally go no further than to restrain federal projects in which the decision
to undertake the project was so unsupported as to be arbitrary. Furthermore,
the cases indicate a tendency to apply the same standard of review to both
the threshold determination and the substantive decision, a further indica-
tion that there exists no special "environmental" standard for courts to em-
ploy.
As far as generalization is possible, the courts in enforcing NEPA have
occupied a middle ground. Judicial inquiry will pierce the administrative
veil to prevent obvious circumvention of the policies of NEPA, but will not
tread where some agency discretion could be exercised.
Richard M. Ashton
104. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971)..
105. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps. of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
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